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The major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
standard for determining if an employee is covered by governmental im-
munity.1 The suit involved one Texas Tech professor suing another for
defamation, which allegedly caused the defamed professor to be passed
over for promotion.2 The defendant moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing under the election-of-remedies provision in the Tort Claims Act3 that
the plaintiff’s claims against her as an individual were barred because she
made the allegedly defamatory statements within the course and scope of
her employment for the university.4 The trial court denied the defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment, and the Amarillo Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that while the defendant’s statements regarding the
plaintiff “may fall within [the defendant’s] duties for the University,” she
“did not conclusively establish that . . . she was serving any purpose of her
employer, as opposed to furthering her own purposes only.”5
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1. Laverie v. Wetherbe, 517 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Tex. 2017).
2. Id. at 750.
3. Id. at 752 (generally requiring a plaintiff to make an early decision on whether a
governmental employee is sued for actions outside the scope of duties for the governmen-
tal employer or within the scope of employment, which would render the governmental
entity vicariously liable); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f) (West
2011).
4. Laverie, 517 S.W.3d at 751. In particular, the defendant was senior associate dean




74 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
The supreme court granted review and rejected the argument that an
employee’s subjective intent is ever relevant in determining whether a
governmental employee is acting within the course and scope of employ-
ment.6 The supreme court held that requiring an employee to prove a
negative—that the employee’s action was not done with an ulterior mo-
tive—would be inconsistent with the Tort Claims Act as well as with its
prior, well-established “scope-of-employment” and respondeat superior
case law.7 The supreme court reaffirmed that whether a governmental
employee is acting within the scope of employment is based exclusively
on an objective review of the employee’s actions and the nature of the
employee’s job duties.8 After conducting the proper analysis, the su-
preme court held that the statements objectively were made within the
scope of the defendant’s employment such that, “[e]ven if [she] defamed
[the plaintiff], she did so while fulfilling her job duties.”9 Because it was
undisputed that the plaintiff’s claims could have been made against the
university, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals, dismissed the
claims against the plaintiff in her individual capacity, and remanded the
remaining claims against her in her official capacity for further
proceedings.10
The Texas Supreme Court addressed another novel sovereign immu-
nity issue in Engelman Irrigation District v. Shields Brothers, Inc.11 This
suit arose out of a long-standing dispute between a contractor and a gov-
ernmental entity.12 In 1992, the contractor obtained a judgment against
the governmental entity under then-existing case law that made sovereign
immunity inapplicable to the claim.13 While the contractor was trying to
collect on the judgment, the supreme court changed the sovereign immu-
nity analysis in Tooke v. City of Mexia.14 The governmental entity then
brought suit seeking a declaration that the original, twenty-five-year-old
judgment was void under the reasoning in Tooke. The trial court denied
the claim, which was affirmed by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals,
and the supreme court granted review.15 While recognizing that “[a] judi-
cial decision generally applies retroactively,” the supreme court held that
this rule does not “allow reopening a final judgment where all direct ap-
peals have been exhausted.”16 The supreme court therefore rejected the
governmental entity’s argument that because it was entitled to sovereign
immunity under Tooke, the original judgment was void and could be col-
6. Id. at 756.
7. Id. at 752–55.
8. Id. at 753, 755.
9. Id. at 755–56.
10. Id. at 756.
11. 514 S.W.3d 746, 747 (Tex. 2017).
12. Id. at 747.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 748 (citing Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006)). According
to the supreme court, Tooke held “that statutory ‘sue and be sued’ language is insufficient
to waive immunity.” Id. at 747.
15. Id. at 747.
16. Id. at 748–49.
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laterally attacked.17 “Favoring finality over uncertainty,” the supreme
court held that sovereign immunity and lack of subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be equated for all purposes and reasoned that allowing collateral
attack on final judgments based on changes in sovereign immunity law
would undermine res judicata principles and respect for judgments.18
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
In Jutalia Recycling, Inc. v. CNA Metals Limited, the Fourteenth Hous-
ton Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have granted
the defendants’ special appearance and rendered judgment dismissing the
plaintiff’s claims.19 In this case, the plaintiff sought to purchase scrap met-
als from a nonresident defendant and sent a “Purchase Contract” stating
that “disputes are subject to Fort Bend County State of Texas Jurisdic-
tion.”20 That same day, the defendant-seller responded with an “Agree-
ment of Sale” that provided the state and federal courts in Richmond
County, New York would have jurisdiction over disputes, which the plain-
tiff’s representative signed above the notation “Accepted By Buyer.”21
When the goods arrived, the plaintiff inspected the materials, found them
worthless, and sued the seller, among others, in Harris County for breach
of contract.22 The seller filed a special appearance, which the trial court
denied, and the seller appealed.23
On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals held that the seller had
not consented to specific jurisdiction in Texas because it had not accepted
the plaintiff’s “Purchase Contract,” but instead offered different venue
terms in the sales agreements, which the plaintiff then accepted.24 How-
ever, the court of appeals rejected the seller’s argument that the parties’
consent to jurisdiction in New York precluded personal jurisdiction over
it in Texas, reasoning that consent to jurisdiction in one venue did not
“foreclose the possibility” of sufficient minimum contacts to support a
Texas court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.25 Nonetheless, the court of
appeals concluded that the seller’s act of contracting with the plaintiff, a
Texas resident, was insufficient to support the trial court’s exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction because the seller had “intended to avoid Texas by
structuring their transactions in such a way as neither to profit from Texas
law nor to subject themselves to jurisdiction there.”26 The court of ap-
peals therefore “render[ed] judgment dismissing [plaintiff’s] claims
17. Id. at 750.
18. Id. at 747, 751–53.
19. Jutalia Recycling, Inc. v. CNA Metals Ltd., 542 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
20. Id. at 93.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 94.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 96.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 99.
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against [the seller] for want of jurisdiction.”27
In Tran v. Tran, the First Houston Court of Appeals concluded that a
defendant had not waived his special appearance by waiting three years
to request a hearing on it or by moving for continuance and responding
on the merits to the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.28
The court of appeals noted that the trial court addressed the defendant’s
special appearance before hearing any other matter and held that, despite
the delay in noticing his special appearance for hearing, the defendant
complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a’s requirements. The
court of appeals found compliance because he had “filed his special ap-
pearance prior to filing his answer, participated in jurisdictional discovery
only, and moved for a hearing on his special appearance,” and only sub-
ject to the trial court’s ruling on the special appearance, moved for con-
tinuance and responded to plaintiff’s summary judgment response.29
IV. VENUE
In Smith v. Smith, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals addressed
whether a party waived his venue objection.30 This case arose out of a
business dispute between brothers.31 The suit was filed in Harris County,
and the defendant filed a motion to transfer venue to Bexar County.32
The plaintiffs responded by arguing, among other things, that the defen-
dant waived his objection to venue by taking various actions in the Harris
County court.33 Without stating its reasoning, the Harris County court
denied the motion to transfer venue, and the defendant sought manda-
mus relief.34 Finding support for the defendant’s waiver in the record, the
court of appeals held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the [motion to transfer venue].”35 Specifically, the court of ap-
peals noted that the defendant (1) did not obtain a hearing on the trans-
fer motion for eleven months; (2) responded to the plaintiffs’ motions for
summary judgment; and (3) joined in a motion for continuance, which
argued the parties needed time to prepare the case.36 The court of ap-
peals reasoned that the eleven-month-delay in obtaining a hearing alone
may not constitute waiver, but that delay combined with the defendant’s
participation in the trial court on the merits, without making the partici-
pation subject to the venue objection, was enough to support a finding of
27. Id. at 99–100.
28. Tran v. Tran, No. 01-16-00248-CV, 2017 WL 817183, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 2, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
29. Id.
30. Smith v. Smith, 541 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no
pet.).
31. Id. at 254.
32. Id. at 254–55.
33. Id. at 255.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 258.
36. Id. at 256–57.
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waiver of the objection.37 Thus, the trial court could properly deny the
venue transfer motion.38
V. PARTIES
In Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court addressed
whether adjacent landowners were necessary parties, under Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 39, to a dispute between a mineral lessor and its lessee.39
In this case, Crawford inherited a tract of land for which XTO Energy,
Inc. (XTO) held an oil-and-gas lease.40 XTO pooled the lease on Craw-
ford’s land with hundreds of other leases, forty-four of which were on
adjacent property.41 Relying on a title opinion that Crawford’s share of
royalties was attributable to adjacent landowners under the strip-and-
gore doctrine, XTO chose not to pay any royalties to Crawford and dis-
tributed his share to the adjacent landowners.42 Thereafter, Crawford
sued XTO, and XTO moved to abate the action and sought to compel
Crawford to join the adjacent landowners as necessary parties.43 The trial
court granted XTO’s motion and dismissed Crawford’s claims when he
failed to join the adjacent landowners to the suit. Crawford appealed, and
a divided Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed.44
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the adjacent land-
owners were not necessary parties to the action under Rule 39.45 The
supreme court reasoned that none of the adjacent landowners had ever
asserted an interest in Crawford’s royalties, and XTO’s assertion they had
such an interest was insufficient.46 The supreme court emphasized that
the mere fact that Crawford’s success would potentially reduce the
amount of XTO’s royalty payments to the landowners did not make them
necessary parties to Crawford’s claims against XTO.47 Further, the su-
preme court noted that XTO could join the landowners under Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 37, but Crawford was not required to do so.48 Accord-
ingly, the supreme court reversed the dismissal of Crawford’s claims
against XTO and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.49
In Elness Swenson Graham Architects, Inc. v. RLJ II-C Austin Air, LP,
the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that a subsequent purchaser of a
hotel had capacity to sue the architectural firm that originally contracted
37. Id. at 257–58.
38. Id. at 258.
39. Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc., 509 S.W.3d 906, 912 (Tex. 2017).
40. Id. at 908.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 908–09.
43. Id. at 909.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 912.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 914.
48. Id.
49. Id.
78 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
with the hotel’s developer for breach of the developer-architect contract,
even though the purchaser was a stranger to the contract and there was
no express assignment of causes of action to the purchaser.50 In this case,
after taking possession and discovering significant foundation problems,
the plaintiff purchaser of the hotel sued the hotel’s architect for breach of
contract and other claims.51 The architect moved for traditional and no-
evidence summary judgment arguing that the purchaser lacked capacity
to bring a claim under the developer-architect contract because it had not
been validly assigned.52 The purchaser cross-moved for summary judg-
ment on the capacity issue; the trial court denied the architect’s motions
and granted the purchaser’s cross-motion.53 The architect appealed.54
On appeal, the architect argued that the trial court erred in concluding
the purchaser had capacity to sue the architect for breach because the
assignment of the developer-architect contract from the developer’s as-
signee to the purchaser did not explicitly assign causes of action relating
to the developer-architect contract.55 As it had below, the purchaser ar-
gued that the developer’s assignee’s assignment to it of the developer-
assignee’s “right, title, and interest in and to all licenses, permits and all
other intangible assets relating to the [hotel]”56 included any causes of
action arising from the developer-architect contract.57 After considering
the generally accepted meaning of the phrase “intangible assets,” the en
banc court of appeals agreed with the purchaser and concluded that
“choses in action” were an “intangible asset” such that the assignor’s or
developer’s assignment to the purchaser, even without express language
to that effect, included all causes of action arising from the developer-
architect contract.58 The court of appeals therefore held that the pur-
chaser had capacity to sue the architect for breach of contract.59
VI. PLEADINGS
The Texas Supreme Court addressed an issue of first impression under
the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act (TCPA) during the Survey period,
and reached a conclusion contrary to several courts of appeals.60 In
Hersh, parents of a teenager who committed suicide sued a news organi-
zation and an individual who provided information for a news article re-
50. Elness Swenson Graham Architects, Inc. v. RLJ II–C Austin Air, LP, 520 S.W.3d
145, 155–56 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied).
51. Id. at 152.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 152–53.
54. Id. at 153.
55. Id. The architect had consented to the developer’s assignment of the developer-
architect contract to the assignee. Id. at 152.
56. Id. at 152.
57. Id. at 153–54.
58. Id. at 154–55.
59. Id. at 155–56.
60. Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017).
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garding their son’s obituary not mentioning that he committed suicide.61
The individual defendant moved to dismiss the case pursuant to the
TCPA while denying that she made the news organization aware of the
obituary at issue.62 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the
Dallas Court of Appeals reversed based on its own prior precedent hold-
ing that a defendant who denies making the alleged communication is not
protected by the TCPA.63 The supreme court granted review.64
Initially, the supreme court noted that several courts of appeals had
held that the TCPA cannot be invoked by a defendant who denies mak-
ing the communication at issue.65 The supreme court rejected these cases
and held that if a plaintiff’s pleadings demonstrate that the action is based
on a communication covered by the TCPA, a defendant need not show
more to invoke the statute’s protection.66 In other words, the supreme
court reasoned that the legal basis of the action controls the TCPA’s ap-
plicability, and that basis is best determined by the plaintiff’s allega-
tions.67 Having found the TCPA was applicable in the underlying case
despite the individual defendant’s denial, the supreme court determined
that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals, and remanded to the court of appeals to consider the remaining
issues.68
During the Survey period, several intermediate courts of appeals also
analyzed whether plaintiffs’ petitions were sufficient to survive motions
to dismiss under the TCPA. In Kirkstall Road Enterprises, Inc. v. Jones,
the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that a negligence suit filed against
the producer of The First 48, a television program documenting murder
investigations, by an individual who was featured on the program was not
subject to dismissal under the TCPA.69 In this case, the plaintiff alleged
that he suffered four gunshot wounds because the defendants failed to
sufficiently conceal his identity when the program aired.70 The defend-
ants moved to dismiss under the TCPA, the trial court denied the motion,
and the court of appeals affirmed the denial.71 The court explained that
because the plaintiff’s claim sought damages resulting from a bodily in-
jury suffered as a result of the defendant’s negligence, the claim fell
within the TCPA’s bodily injury exception.72
61. Id. at 464.
62. Id. at 465.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 466–67.
66. Id. at 467.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 468.
69. Kirkstall Road Enters., Inc. v. Jones, 523 S.W.3d 251, 252–53 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2017, no pet.).
70. Id. at 252.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 253.
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In Van Der Linden v. Khan, the plaintiff asserted claims against his
neighbor for tortious interference with contract and with prospective bus-
iness relations along with claims for defamation and defamation per se
after his neighbor sent a private message through Facebook to three of
his business associates accusing the plaintiff of admitting to giving money
to the Taliban.73 The trial court denied the neighbor’s motion to dismiss
the claims under the TCPA, and she brought an interlocutory appeal.74
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that his claims were not subject to dismis-
sal under the TCPA because he did not bring the suit for the purpose of
discouraging the defendant’s exercise of “her right to free speech—but
instead solely because [she] intentionally interfered with [his] business
deals . . . .”75 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected this argument out
of hand, explaining that “[f]or reasons so obvious that further elaboration
should not be necessary, financial support for a terrorist organization is
an issue related to safety and community well-being” such that the neigh-
bor’s statement was an exercise of free speech as defined by the TCPA.76
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the action was “based on,
relate[d] to, or [was] in response to [the neighbor’s] exercise of her right
of free speech” and thus subject to the TCPA regardless of the plaintiff’s
purpose in bringing the suit.77 The court of appeals therefore reversed the
trial court’s order denying the neighbor’s motion to dismiss except with
respect to the plaintiff’s defamation and defamation per se claims, which
the court of appeals found were adequately pleaded, and remanded to
the trial court.78
Whether the defendants’ declaratory-judgment counterclaim ade-
quately stated a claim under the Declaratory Judgments Act and did not
simply repeat their affirmative defenses was at issue in Garden Oaks
Maintenance Organization v. Chang.79 In this case, the plaintiff home-
owners’ association sued two homeowners for deed restriction violations
and sought injunctive relief, removal of offending structures, and dam-
ages.80 The homeowners counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that
the association lacked authority to enforce any deed restrictions under
the Texas Property Code and the association’s bylaws.81 After a jury trial,
the trial court rendered judgment against the association and in favor of
the homeowners, and the association appealed.82 On appeal, the Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals rejected the association’s argument
that the homeowners’ declaratory-judgment counterclaim should have
73. Van Der Linden v. Khan, 535 S.W.3d 179, 186–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017,
pet. filed).
74. Id. at 188.
75. Id. at 189.
76. Id. at 189–90 (citation omitted).
77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 202.
79. 542 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
80. Id. at 120–21.
81. Id. at 121.
82. Id. at 122–23.
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been dismissed because it merely repeated their affirmative defenses.83
The court of appeals reasoned that the counterclaim sought a declaration
that the association could not enforce any of the deed restrictions rather
than just the single restriction the association asserted the homeowners
violated.84 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the homeowners’
counterclaim stated a claim independent of their affirmative defenses to
the association’s claims.85
VII. DISCOVERY
The Texas Supreme Court analyzed the standards for the discovery of
electronically stored information (ESI) in In re State Farm Lloyds.86 The
plaintiff insureds requested the production of ESI in native form, whereas
the defendant insurer preferred to produce its documents in searchable
static form.87 The trial court ordered production in native form, provided
it was not infeasible to do so, and the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
denied the insurer’s request for mandamus relief.88
The insurer sought mandamus relief from the Texas Supreme Court,
which issued its most detailed opinion to date regarding the standards for
the discovery of ESI. As part of its analysis, the supreme court looked at
the interplay between Rule 196.4, which allows the requesting party to
specify the desired form of production, and Rule 192.4, which details limi-
tations on discovery based on proportionality and reasonableness.89 After
rejecting the notion that Rule 196.4 gave the requesting party the unilat-
eral right to dictate the form of production, the supreme court addressed
how trial courts should resolve the responding party’s objection that the
requested form is unreasonable and that the information can be obtained
through a “reasonably usable” alternative form, which entails considera-
tion of whether the utility and benefits of the requested form are great
enough to overcome the extra “burden, cost, or convenience” associated
with it.90
Next, the supreme court turned to the factors considered in determin-
ing proportionality, which include: (1) the “[l]ikely benefit of the re-
83. Id. at 124.
84. Id. at 126.
85. Id. at 128.
86. 520 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding).
87. Id. at 599. “Native” refers to the application form in which the producing party
typically creates, uses, and stores data in the regular course of business, whereas data in
“static” form, which is exemplified by PDF, TIFF, and JPEG files, is converted from native
form and can be made searchable through optical character recognition software. Id. at 615
n.12, 601.
88. Id. at 599 (citing In re State Farm Lloyds, 519 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2015, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.), mand. denied, id. at 615 (holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that production in native form was
neither unduly burdensome nor had a likely benefit that was outweighed by the burden or
expense of such production).
89. Id. at 599.
90. Id. at 607.
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quested discovery”;91 (2) the “needs of the case”;92 (3) the “amount in
controversy”;93 (4) the respective resources of the parties;94 (5) the
“[i]mportance of the issues at stake in the litigation”;95 (6) the “impor-
tance of the proposed discovery in resolving the litigation”;96 and (7)
“[a]ny other articulable factor bearing on proportionality.”97 After con-
sidering these factors, the trial court can order the production in the man-
ner chosen by the responding party, “another form that is proportionally
appropriate,” or the requested form—provided that the requesting party
has shown a “particularized need” for that method and has paid the rea-
sonable cost associated with any extraordinary production efforts.98 The
supreme court thus denied mandamus relief without prejudice so that the
insurer could re-urge its objections in light of these standards.99
In In re National Lloyds Insurance Company, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the discovery of the opposing party’s billing records by a party
seeking an award of attorney’s fees.100 In this multidistrict litigation
(MDL) between insured homeowners and several insurers and claims ad-
justors, the plaintiffs sought to recover their attorney’s fees. In the first
MDL case to go to a verdict, counsel for one of the insurers, who was a
designated expert on fees, testified over objection that the insurer’s fees
could be “a factor” in determining the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’
fees.101 A couple of months before trial, the plaintiffs sought a continu-
ance and leave to serve written discovery requests seeking details regard-
ing the fees and expenses incurred by the defendants.102 The insurer
challenged these requests as overly broad and seeking privileged informa-
tion, and it contended that the requested information was irrelevant
based primarily on its stipulation that it would not use its own fee infor-
mation to challenge the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ fee claims.103
The special master and MDL pretrial court rejected these objections and
ordered the insurer to respond to these requests, and the Corpus Christi
91. Id. at 608. According to the supreme court, if the perceived “benefits of the re-
quested form are negligible [or] nonexistent,” then any showing of “enhanced effort[ ] or
expense” warrants denial, whereas a showing of a “particularized need for the proposed
discovery” may lead, once the other factors are taken into account, to the opposite conclu-
sion. Id.
92. Id. This factor considers the relevance of the metadata (or other details) that the
requesting party is seeking and the availability of that information from more accessible or
less expensive sources. Id. at 608–09.
93. Id. at 610.
94. Id. This factor examines not only the financial wherewithal of the parties, but also
the requesting party’s ability to use the information in the requested format. Id. at 610–11.
95. Id. at 611.
96. Id.
97. Id. As part of this analysis, the supreme court sought to align the discovery of ESI
under Texas law with that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding the
differences in the wording of the respective rules. Id. at 612–15.
98. Id. at 607.
99. Id. at 615.
100. In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 532 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding).
101. Id. at 799–800.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 801.
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Court of Appeals denied the insurer’s request for mandamus relief.104 As
part of its analysis, the court of appeals found that the insurer’s billing
information was relevant to the first and third Arthur Andersen factors
(“the time and labor required” and “the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar legal services”),105 had served as the basis of some of
its expert’s testimony,106 and was within the scope of expert-witness dis-
covery under Rule 192.3(e).107
The Texas Supreme Court, however, conditionally granted mandamus
relief and directed the trial court to vacate its discovery order.108 Initially,
the supreme court found that a request for the opposing party’s billing
records in the aggregate reveals its attorneys’ thought processes and thus
invades the work-product exemption.109 However, the supreme court left
open the possibility that a “narrowly tailored request” that somehow did
not invade the strategy or thought processes of the opposing party’s attor-
neys might be permissible. Additionally, the supreme court acknowl-
edged both the “substantial need” exception in Rule 192.5(b)(2) for the
discovery of otherwise unavailable information and the possibility that
the opposing party could waive the work product exemption through of-
fensive use by either seeking its fees or using its own billing records to
challenge the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ fees.110
Next, the supreme court turned its attention to the relevance of the
plaintiffs’ interrogatories, which sought factual information regarding the
rates, hours, and expenses of the insurer’s attorneys.111 Once again, the
supreme court held that, so long as the opposing party did not seek its
fees or use the hours and rates of its counsel as a measuring stick, such
information was not relevant because opposing parties have different
motivations and roles and may elect to spend more or less time and effort
on issues than the parties who are seeking to recover.112 Additionally, a
party seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden of proving their fees are
reasonable and necessary.113 For example, the insurer may pay lower
104. Id.; In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 13-15-00219-CV, 2015 WL 4380929, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi July 14, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
105. In re Nat’l Lloyds, 2015 WL 4380929, at *5 (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry
Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)).
106. Id. at *4–5.
107. Id. at *5.
108. In re Nat’l Lloyds, 532 S.W.3d at 816.
109. Id. at 803. The supreme court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that any privileged
information could be preserved through redaction, as redacted billing records would still
reveal when, where, and how the insurer focused its efforts and might result in collateral
disputes as to the propriety of the redactions. Id. at 806.
110. Id. at 806–07. The supreme court noted that billing records might be protected by
the attorney-client privilege but found that the insurer had not established the applicability
of that exemption. Id. at 807.
111. Id. at 807–08.
112. Id. at 808.
113. Id. at 809. In fact, in rejecting the plaintiffs’ reliance on the two Arthur Andersen
factors cited by the court of appeals, the supreme court observed that collateral litigation
might ensue on the reasonableness of the opposing party’s fees, and that in light of the
differing perspectives and positions of the parties, attorneys might not be providing “simi-
lar legal services” in the same case. Id. at 810–11.
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hourly rates to its attorneys with a promise of repeat business, yet it may
be more demanding on them in terms of its reporting requirements.114
And any marginal relevance of the opposing party’s fee information
might be outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice or misleading the
jury.115
Finally, the supreme court examined the impact of the opposing party’s
designation of its counsel as an expert witness on attorney’s fees.116 Rule
192.3 permits discovery into the facts known by the expert with respect to
his or her opinions and the documents that the expert received or re-
viewed, and provides that the work product exemption is inapplicable to
this information.117 As the supreme court observed, however, Rule 195
addresses discovery from experts, and while it allows disclosures, written
reports, and depositions, it does not allow for the interrogatories and pro-
duction requests that the plaintiffs had promulgated.118 Since the plain-
tiffs were not invoking the permissible discovery devices, the supreme
court found the trial court’s reliance on Rule 192.3(e) to be misplaced.119
Sanctions arising out of the suspension of a deposition were the subject
of Wilson v. Shamoun & Norman, LLP.120 A law firm sued its former
client for unpaid fees, and the firm served a deposition notice on the for-
mer client in an action which the client’s new lawyer contended the trial
court lacked jurisdiction.121 After the client was sworn in, the new lawyer
suspended the deposition, and the former firm filed a motion to compel
and sought sanctions.122 After the trial court entered sanctions of
$1,837.50, the new lawyer and his firm appealed.123
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed.124 After rejecting the appel-
lants’ challenges to the trial court’s jurisdiction, the court of appeals
turned to the propriety of the sanctions order.125 Initially, the court of
appeals found the appellants’ reliance on Rule 199.5(g) to be misplaced,
as that rule applied only when (1) the time limit for the deposition had
expired or (2) the rules governing deposition conduct had been vio-
lated.126 Since the appellants stopped the deposition based on jurisdic-
tional concerns rather than conduct during the deposition, they could not
rely on Rule 199.5(g).127
The court of appeals then turned to the trial court’s finding that the
appellants had “abus[ed] the discovery process” in violation of Rule
114. Id. at 811.
115. Id. at 813 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 403; TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4).
116. Id. at 813–15.
117. Id. at 813–14; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(e)(3)–(4), (6), 192.5(c)(1).
118. In re Nat’l Lloyds, 532 S.W.3d at 814 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 195.1).
119. Id. at 814–15.
120. 523 S.W.3d 222, 224 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. denied).
121. Id. at 224–25.
122. Id. at 225.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 233.
125. Id. at 228.
126. Id. at 229–30.
127. Id.
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199.4, which prohibits parties from “seeking, making, and/or resisting dis-
covery in a timely manner.”128 Admittedly unable to find any supporting
authority, the court of appeals nonetheless held that the appellants could
have avoided sanctions for aborting the deposition by filing a motion to
quash to address their jurisdictional challenge.129
Finally, the court of appeals held that a finding of bad faith was not a
prerequisite to the imposition of monetary (as opposed to death penalty)
sanctions and that the sanctions imposed by the trial court were appropri-
ate for the conduct at issue.130
The interplay between a trial court’s docket control order and a discov-
ery stay under chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
was at issue in Harvey v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc.131 The
docket control order established a deadline of March 30, 2015, for the
plaintiff heirs to designate their experts.132 The trial court sustained the
defendant hospital’s objection to the heirs’ timely submitted reports and
gave the heirs until May 7, 2015, to serve amended reports.133 The hospi-
tal then filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, which was
based on the heirs’ failure to present expert testimony by the March 30,
2015, deadline in the docket control order. The hospital also objected to
the amended expert report the heirs had served on May 7, 2015.134 The
trial court struck the expert witness affidavits that the heirs submitted
with their response and entered summary judgment in the hospital’s
favor.135
The heirs appealed based solely on the grounds that “discovery was
stayed under chapter 74” at the time the hospital sought summary judg-
ment.136 Section 74.351 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code stays all
discovery in a healthcare liability case and permits one thirty-day exten-
sion where the initial report is deficient.137 “[B]ecause the amended ex-
pert report had not yet been served” and the trial court had not
determined its adequacy at the time the hospital sought summary judg-
ment, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that discovery was
stayed at the time of the expert designation deadline.138 The court of ap-
peals then held, based on Section 74.002(a) of the Civil Practice and
128. Id. at 230.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 230, 233.
131. 525 S.W.3d 281, 282 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Under chap-
ter 74, “a healthcare liability [plaintiff]” must “serve at least one expert report on the
defendant or defendant’s attorney within 120 days” of the defendant’s answer. Id. at 286
n.4; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2017).




136. Id. at 284.
137. Id. at 284–85; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a), (c) (West
2017).
138. Harvey, 525 S.W.3d at 285.
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Remedies Code,139 that the discovery stay under chapter 74 superseded
the expert designation deadline in the docket control order.140 The court
of appeals thus reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case
for further proceedings.141
The discovery of potentially privileged documents was at the heart of
In re Fairway Methanol LLC.142 Following a workplace accident, the em-
ployer promptly began an investigation into the accident under the aus-
pices of its law department.143 Several months after the accident, the
plaintiff and his wife sued the joint venture and two of the employer’s
affiliates and served discovery on the joint venture and the non-party em-
ployer seeking, among other documents, “all incident, accident and/or in-
vestigation reports,” “all statements related to [the accident],” and all
interview-related documents.144 Both the joint venture and the employer
asserted that they were withholding documents on the basis of the attor-
ney-client privilege and the work product exemption, but following an in
camera review, the trial court ordered the employer to produce the docu-
ments related to its investigation.145
The employer sought mandamus relief, which the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals granted with respect to the bulk of the documents at
issue.146 As part of its analysis, the court of appeals found that the em-
ployer had made a prima facie showing as to the applicability of the attor-
ney-client privilege through an affidavit from the in-house counsel of one
of its affiliates.147 That finding included communications between and
among members of the investigative team who did not necessarily have
the authority to hire counsel and act on counsel’s advice.148 The employer
also made a prima facie showing that the work product exemption ap-
plied, as a reasonable person would have believed—and the employer
had a good faith belief—that there was a substantial chance litigation
would ensue. The employer could establish a prima facie case regardless
of the fact that the plaintiff had not manifested an intention to sue at the
outset of the investigation and that the employer was potentially pro-
tected from a lawsuit by Section 408.001 of the Texas Labor Code, which
establishes a worker’s compensation claim as the employee’s exclusive
remedy.149 The court of appeals conducted an in camera review of the
documents at issue and found that the bulk of the documents were privi-
139. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.002(a) (providing that chapter
74 generally controls in the event of a conflict with “another law, including a rule of proce-
dure or evidence or court rule”).
140. Harvey, 525 S.W.3d at 285.
141. Id. at 286.
142. 515 S.W.3d 480, 485 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 486.
145. Id. Since the joint venture “did not participate in any investigation,” it did not have
any investigation-related documents to produce. Id.
146. Id. at 495.
147. Id. at 489.
148. Id. at 488–89.
149. Id. at 491–92.
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leged with the exception of a few documents that were prepared for busi-
ness purposes, such as instituting remedial measures or conducting
performance evaluations.150
The availability of discovery in an uninsured/underinsured motorist
case was at issue in In re Liberty County Mutual Insurance Company.151
At the insurer’s request, the trial court severed and abated the plaintiff’s
extra-contractual claims, and the plaintiff subsequently served discovery
requests regarding topics relating to the abated claims.152 The plaintiff
sought to depose the claims adjuster who verified the insurer’s interro-
gatory answers and dropped her claim for breach of contract, leaving her
with only a claim for declaratory relief.153 After the trial court denied the
insurer’s motion to quash, the insurer sought mandamus relief.154
The First Houston Court of Appeals granted the requested relief, find-
ing that the “scope of relevant discovery in uninsured motorist cases”
focuses primarily on the potential liability and coverage of the uninsured
driver and the extent of the insured’s damages.155 “Because [the in-
surer’s] contractual obligations d[id] not ripen until after [the insured]
ha[d] obtained a judgment against [the uninsured driver],” the requested
deposition was irrelevant to the declaratory relief claim at issue.156
Ramirez v. Noble Energy, Inc.157 addressed the standards for the with-
drawal of merits-preclusive deemed admissions. The injured plaintiff
failed to respond to the defendant’s requests for admissions on time, and
he served his responses one day after the deadline imposed in the order
granting the defendant’s motion to compel.158 The defendant moved for
summary judgment based on the deemed admissions and also sought
sanctions for the plaintiff’s alleged discovery misconduct.159 The plaintiff
moved to withdraw the deemed admissions and sought an extension of
time to respond to the summary judgment motion. He contended that his
failure to answer the deemed admissions on time was because his coun-
sel’s his long-time assistant had quit and the replacement assistant, then
in training, quit without calendaring the response deadline.160 The plain-
tiff never filed a response to the defendant’s summary judgment motion,
and the trial court entered summary judgment in the defendant’s favor
and denied both the defendant’s motion for sanctions and the plaintiff’s
150. Id. at 494–95.
151. 537 S.W.3d 214, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding).
152. Id. at 217.
153. Id. at 218–19.
154. Id. at 219.
155. Id. at 220.
156. Id. at 221. The court of appeals also found that the claims adjuster’s involvement in
helping to answer and verify the insurer’s interrogatory answers, the bulk of which ad-
dressed the abated extra-contractual claims, did not warrant her deposition. Id.
157. 521 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
158. Id. at 854.
159. Id. at 854–55.
160. Id. at 855.
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motion to withdraw the deemed admissions.161
The First Houston Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial
court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion to withdraw the deemed ad-
missions.162 To warrant the withdrawal of deemed admissions, the re-
sponding party must show “good cause by showing that the failure to
timely respond . . . was an accident or mistake,” such as a clerical error,
and that the failure was “not intentional or the result of conscious indif-
ference;” and lack of undue prejudice to the other party.163 But where
merits-preclusive requests are at issue, the burden is on the party pro-
pounding the requests to show “flagrant bad faith or callous disregard for
the rules.”164 The requests at issue included that the defendant “admit
that [he] was not a proper [party],” that he did not own the truck, and
that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by a “steel plate . . . on the truck that
he drove.”165 Even though the plaintiff ultimately admitted the latter two
requests, the court of appeals concluded that the first request was merits-
preclusive as it improperly asked the plaintiff to admit the invalidity of
his claim.166 The court of appeals then found that the defendant had
failed to show flagrant bad faith or callous disregard, as the staffing issues
of the plaintiff’s counsel sufficiently explained the delay, and since merits-
preclusive requests were at issue, the plaintiff did not have to establish
“good cause.”167
In In re Kubosh Bail Bonding, the First Houston Court of Appeals
noted that it is the client, not the attorney, who must have “a good faith
belief that litigation would ensue” as required for the applicability of the
work product exemption.168 Even though one of the plaintiffs’ lawyers
submitted an affidavit regarding his beliefs, in the absence of proof re-
garding the potential clients’ beliefs, the court of appeals found that the
emails at issue were not work product.169
VIII. DISMISSAL
Throughout the Survey period, intermediate courts of appeals have
continued to grapple with the proper application of Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 91a. For example, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed
whether a suit could be dismissed under Rule 91a based on an affirmative
161. Id. at 856. The trial court never ruled on the plaintiff’s motion for additional time
to respond to the summary judgment motion. Id.
162. Id. at 862.
163. Id. at 856.
164. Id. at 857 (citing Marino v. King, 355 S.W.3d 629, 633 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam);
Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 859.
167. Id. at 859–61.
168. In re Kubosh Bail Bonding, 522 S.W.3d 75, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2017, orig. proceeding).
169. Id. at 87–89. The court of appeals also made an alternative holding that the work
product exemption was waived through offensive use, as “the Emails demonstrate[d] that
the Plaintiffs’ counsel and [a third party] worked together to set up” the telephone calls
that established the basis for the prospective clients’ claims. Id. at 90.
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defense.170 In this case, the trial court granted a Rule 91a motion based
on the defendant’s limitations defense, and the plaintiff appealed.171 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that in deciding a Rule 91a motion the
trial court could only consider the plaintiff’s petition, such that affirma-
tive defenses raised only in the defendant’s answer could not support
dismissal.172
Additionally, two courts of appeals reached different conclusions re-
garding the appropriate standard for determining whether a petition
should be dismissed under Rule 91a.173 Specifically, the El Paso Court of
Appeals held in Aguilar v. Morales that the review of a petition’s allega-
tions under Rule 91a should be similar to review of a complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal if the
complaint fails to give “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plau-
sible on its face.”174 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals disagreed in
Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi.175 In that case, the court of appeals ana-
lyzed the differences between the Texas and federal pleading standards
and concluded that a petition should be dismissed under Rule 91a only if
it appeared that the allegations, when accepted as true, failed to provide
“fair notice of [any] cause of action that is cognizable under Texas
law.”176
Several cases in the Survey period also addressed various procedural
issues in the application of Rule 91a. In Aguilar, the El Paso Court of
Appeals decided whether a Rule 91a motion was timely filed after a
venue transfer that was reversed on appeal.177 In that case, plaintiffs orig-
inally filed suit in El Paso County against their sister and brother-in-law
for the alleged wrongful death of their mother.178 The sister moved to
transfer the case to the probate court in Bexar County where the
mother’s estate administration was pending, and the El Paso County
170. Bedford Internet Office Space, LLC v. Tex. Ins. Group, Inc., 537 S.W.3d 717, 718
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. filed).
171. Id. at 718–19.
172. Id. at 720.
173. See Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2017, no pet.); Aguilar v. Morales, 545 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied).
174. Aguilar, 545 S.W.3d at 676 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nota-
bly, the court of appeals relied on more recent articulations by the U.S. Supreme Court of
the federal dismissal standard. Id. (citing cases interpreting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
175. Reaves, 518 S.W.3d at 612.
176. Id. at 614. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals expressly rejected the
Twombly and Iqbal dismissal standards as inconsistent with Texas pleading practice. Id. at
609–10. Instead, the court adopted a standard of review more consistent with the Conley v.
Gibson federal standard preceding Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 611 (citing Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)). Under the Conley standard, dismissal of a complaint “for failure to state a claim”
was appropriate only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at
45–46).
177. Aguilar, 545 S.W.3d at 677.
178. Id. at 674.
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court granted the motion.179 After transfer, the defendants answered and
then moved to dismiss under Rule 91a. The probate court granted the
motion to dismiss, and plaintiffs appealed both the transfer and dismissal.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the transfer was improper
and remanded the case to the El Paso County court.180 On remand, the
defendants again moved to dismiss under Rule 91a, which the trial court
granted, and plaintiffs appealed again.181 This time on appeal, the plain-
tiffs argued that the Rule 91a motion was untimely because the defend-
ants did not file it within sixty days after the first pleading containing the
challenged cause of action, which had been filed in the El Paso County
court before the venue transfer.182 The El Paso Court of Appeals rejected
the plaintiffs’ construction of Rule 91a’s sixty-day requirement, reasoning
that it would lead to absurd results particularly in cases where venue is
transferred, and held that the defendants’ second motion to dismiss re-
lated back to their first, timely-filed motion.183
In Reaves, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals addressed other issues
under Rule 91a, including the time limit for deciding Rule 91a motions
and whether they could be considered a plea to the jurisdiction when
immunity was raised.184 In this case, the plaintiffs sued the City of Corpus
Christi for injuries they sustained in a car accident caused by a high-speed
police chase.185 The City filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss based on
governmental immunity, which the trial court granted, and plaintiffs ap-
pealed.186 On appeal, plaintiffs argued dismissal under Rule 91a was im-
proper because the motion must be “granted or denied within 45 days
after the motion is filed,” and the trial court lost jurisdiction by failing to
rule on the City’s motion within forty-five days.187
In accord with the First Houston Court of Appeals, the court held that
Rule 91a’s forty-five-day-ruling requirement, while mandatory, was not
jurisdictional.188 The court of appeals, applying the factors of Helena
Chemical Co. v. Wilkins, reasoned that enforcement of the forty-five-day
deadline by mandamus would not further Rule 91a’s objective, and there
was “little reason to believe that the Legislature or the Texas Supreme




182. Id. at 677.
183. Id. at 679.
184. Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 597 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2017, no pet.).
185. Id. at 598.
186. Id. at 598–99.
187. Id. at 601. The City’s Rule 91a motion had been pending for 159 days at the time
the trial court granted it. Id.
188. Id. at 601, 615 n.3 (citing Koenig v. Blaylock, 497 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2016, pet. denied) (holding the deadline is not jurisdictional or mandatory); Walker
v. Owens, 492 S.W.3d 787, 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.)).
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deadline to avoid the dismissal of their own baseless claims.”189 Next, the
plaintiffs argued that a Rule 91a motion was not the equivalent of a plea
to the jurisdiction, and under Rule 91a, the trial court was only allowed to
look at the pleadings rather than extrinsic evidence as permitted in a ju-
risdictional plea.190 The court of appeals agreed, holding that while there
are similarities between a Rule 91a motion and a plea to the jurisdiction,
since the City filed a Rule 91a motion, the Rule 91a standards of review
applied.191 Applying those standards (in conflict with Aguilar discussed
above), the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of the City’s
Rule 91a motion and remanded for further proceedings.192
The El Paso Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of the forum
non conveniens statute193 to actions for wrongful death or personal in-
jury, an issue of first impression.194 The plaintiff, a Texas resident, argued
that the trial court’s dismissal of his claims for non-bodily injuries for
forum non conveniens was precluded by Section 71.051.195 The court of
appeals framed the issue as whether the “personal injury” covered by
Section 71.051 included any injuries caused by torts regardless of physical
or bodily injury.196 Finding no direct controlling authority, the court of
appeals analyzed the statute to determine what the legislature meant by
the term “personal injury.”197 After applying rules of statutory construc-
tion, the court of appeals held that “personal injury” meant “bodily in-
jury,” and therefore found that Section 71.051 did not preclude dismissal
of plaintiff’s claims solely for non-bodily injuries.198
IX. JURY PRACTICE
Allegedly improper jury argument was one of the subjects of In re
BCH Development.199 After the trial court entered summary judgment
on the plaintiff homeowners’ association’s claims, the parties tried the
association’s entitlement to attorney’s fees under Section 5.006 of the
Property Code.200 The association’s expert testified that $579,954.45
would be a reasonable fee, and after the jury awarded only $290,000.00,
the association sought and was granted a new trial.201
One of the grounds the trial court cited in its new trial order was that
counsel for the defendant homebuilder had engaged in improper jury ar-
189. Id. at 603 (analyzing Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 494–95 (Tex.
2001)).
190. Id. at 604.
191. Id. at 605–06.
192. Id. at 615.
193. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(i) (West Supp. 2017).
194. Daniels v. New Mexico, 538 S.W.3d 139, 142–43 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet.
denied).
195. Id. at 145.
196. Id. at 147.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 147–48.
199. 525 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, orig. proceeding).
200. Id. at 923.
201. Id. at 923–24.
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gument.202 As the Dallas Court of Appeals observed, a “complaint about
improper, but curable, jury argument is waived” in the absence of a
timely objection, whereas incurable jury argument can be raised for the
first time in a motion for new trial.203 Although the association had ob-
jected to two of the complained-of statements regarding the failure to
segregate and the assertion that $150,000.00 would be a reasonable fee,
the court of appeals found that the arguments were not improper, as they
were both reasonable inferences from the evidence and did not violate
the limine order.204 The court of appeals also found that “the unobjected
to arguments . . . did not amount to fundamental error.”205 Having re-
jected the association’s other arguments, the court of appeals concluded
that the new trial order was an abuse of discretion and conditionally
granted mandamus relief.206
In Texas Capital Bank v. Asche, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed
potential jury misconduct arising from a LinkedIn contact.207 In Asche,
counsel for the children in a will contest inadvertently sent one of the
jurors a LinkedIn invitation while he was investigating the jury.208 The
children’s counsel notified the court, but the opposing parties’ counsel,
fearful of aggravating the situation, proposed waiting to see if the juror
disclosed the contact.209 The juror did not disclose the contact, and he
accepted the invitation the day of the verdict but prior to the entry of
judgment.210 The opposing parties learned of the acceptance after the
trial and moved for a new trial based on juror misconduct.211 The trial
court denied the motion, and the opposing parties appealed.212
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed on this issue, finding that the
appellants failed to prove an abuse of discretion.213 The appellants had
supported their motion for new trial with post-trial deposition testimony
from the juror and two of the children’s lawyers, but the trial court did
not conduct a hearing.214 A prior decision of the court of appeals had
held that a trial court may deny a motion for new trial based on alleged
jury misconduct where the complaining party merely relies on affidavits
202. Id. at 924 (noting that the improper argument included “attacking the Association
and its attorneys, criticizing the use of a contingency fee agreement and lack of segregation
of fees, and stating that $150,000 was a reasonable fee through trial”).
203. Id. at 928.
204. Id. at 928–29.
205. Id. at 928; see also De Leon v. Red Wing Brands of Am., Inc., No. 05-15-01517-CV,
2017 WL 3699654, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2017, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (finding
that jury argument to which no objection was made did not constitute incurable jury
argument).
206. In re BCH, 525 S.W.3d at 930.
207. Tex. Capital Bank v. Asche, No. 05-15-00102-CV, 2017 WL 655923, at *17 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 17, 2017, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.).
208. Id.
209. Id. at *17–18.
210. Id. at *18.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *20.
214. Id. at *18.
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and does not request a hearing at which it can offer a live testimony es-
tablishing the misconduct.215 In the absence of a hearing request, the
court of appeals concluded that there was insufficient evidence in the re-
cord to find an abuse of discretion.216 The court of appeals also found
that, while the contact with the juror constituted misconduct, it was not
“so highly prejudicial and inimical to fairness as to trigger” a presumption
that the communication, in and of itself, showed “materiality and proba-
ble injury.”217
X. JURY CHARGE
The propriety of the theory of recovery submitted to the jury was one
of the subjects of United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine.218 The plaintiff sued
his employer’s scaffolding contractor for injuries he sustained in a fall.219
In the first trial, “[t]he trial court submitted a general-negligence ques-
tion,” which the contractor had offered, and the jury awarded the plaintiff
$178,000.00 for his future medical expenses.220 On the plaintiff’s motion,
the trial court granted a new trial, and following years of appellate wran-
gling, the case was re-tried.221
At the retrial, the trial court again offered “a general-negligence ques-
tion to the jury,” and the contractor neither objected to that question nor
tendered a premises liability question.222 After the jury awarded almost
$2 million to the plaintiff, the contractor moved for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and alleged, “for the first time,” that the plaintiff’s
claim truly sounded in premises liability, not general negligence.223 The
trial court entered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, and the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals affirmed.224
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment in the con-
tractor’s favor.225 The supreme court noted that “[n]egligence and prem-
ises liability claims,” while sharing some similarities, “are separate and
distinct theories of recovery.”226 After determining that the plaintiff’s
claim ultimately sounded in premises liability, even though the contractor
did not own the property, the supreme court then turned to the submis-
215. Id. (citing In re Zimmer, 451 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, orig.
proceeding)).
216. Id. at *19–20.
217. Id. at *19 (citing Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. McCaslin, 317 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex.
1958)).
218. 537 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. 2017).
219. Id. at 467–68.




224. Id. (citing United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine, 520 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2015) (mem. op.), rev’d, 537 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. 2017)).
225. Id. at 483.
226. Id. at 471 (noting that negligence claims result from the owner’s “affirmative, con-
temporaneous conduct,” whereas a premises liability claim is “based on the owner’s failure
to take measures to make the property safe”).
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sion of the case to the jury.227 First, the supreme court found that the
plaintiff had waived his premises liability claim by failing to either request
a question on the theory or secure findings on its elements.228 Second, the
supreme court concluded that the contractor had not waived this error by
failing to object to the charge, as the contractor was under no obligation
to object where it faced an omitted, as opposed to a defective, submis-
sion.229 Third, the supreme court found that the contractor had not in-
vited the error by requesting a general negligence charge in the first trial,
as following the new trial order, invited error could arise only in the sec-
ond trial.230 Fourth, the contractor preserved its complaints regarding the
submission of the wrong theory by asserting the argument in its motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.231
The failure to secure a necessary jury finding was an expensive mistake
in Enterprise Products Partners v. Energy Transfer Partners.232 The jury
found that the parties were in a general partnership and that the defen-
dant had breached its duty of loyalty, resulting in an award of over $319
million in actual damages and $150 million in disgorgement.233 On ap-
peal, the defendant contended that a partnership did not exist because
the conditions precedent in the parties’ agreements, which required ap-
proval by both boards of directors and the execution of definitive agree-
ments, never occurred.234 Agreeing with the defendant’s analysis, the
Dallas Court of Appeals then turned to whether the parties had waived
the performance of these conditions precedent or they were otherwise
nullified.235 The plaintiff did not allege in its last petition that all condi-
tions precedent had been satisfied, whereas the defendant specifically de-
nied that they were.236 The burden was thus on the plaintiff to prove an
excuse for the failure to perform the conditions precedent, and since the
plaintiff failed to secure a jury finding on waiver, the court of appeals
reversed and rendered judgment in the defendant’s favor.237
A party’s failure to secure a jury finding on whether “a gas well was
incapable of production in paying quantities” on the operative date was
at issue in BP America Production Co. v. Red Deer Resources, LLC.238
The top leaseholder sued to terminate the underlying lease on the
grounds that the lease (1) “had not produced in paying quantities” as of a
date certain, and (2) had “an unexcused total cessation of production”
227. Id. at 479–80.
228. Id. at 481.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 482.
231. Id.
232. 529 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. filed).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 537.
235. Id. at 540–41.
236. Id. at 540.
237. Id. at 541, 545; see also Vance v. Popkowski, 534 S.W.3d 474, 481 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. filed) (holding that the plaintiffs had waived their affirmative
defenses of abandonment and waiver by failing to secure jury findings on them).
238. 526 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex. 2017).
2018] Civil Procedure: Pre-Trial & Trial 95
that was not saved by “the shut-in clause . . . because the [one remaining]
well was incapable of producing in paying quantities” on the day after the
date certain.239 The jury found in favor of the top leaseholder on its sec-
ond ground, and the trial court entered judgment in the top leaseholder’s
favor.240 The court of appeals affirmed, essentially finding “that the lease
could be terminated based on the jury’s finding that the well” could not
“produc[e] in paying quantities the day after it was shut in.”241
The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed and rendered judgment
in favor of the leaseholder. The shut-in clause at issue provided that the
leaseholder’s payment of a “shut-in royalty within twelve months after
the day gas is last sold or used” sustained the lease “for that prior twelve-
month period,” provided that “the well was capable of production in pay-
ing quantities over a reasonable period of time on the date that gas was
last sold or used.”242 Since the critical “date under the shut-in clause
[was] the date the last gas was sold or used,” it was incumbent on the top
leaseholder to prove that the one “well was incapable of production in
paying quantities over a reasonable period of time as of” that date.243
The supreme court then turned to the top leaseholder’s argument that
the leaseholder “waived this issue by failing to [raise it] at the charge
conference.”244 Although the leaseholder never informed the trial court
that the question at issue was using the wrong date, the supreme court
found that an objection was not required because the jury’s answer to this
question was immaterial as it used the wrong date.245 Thus the lease-
holder did not have to object at the charge conference and could instead
raise this issue through a post-verdict motion.246
Jury charge issues were at the heart of Duradril, L.L.C. v. Dynomax
Drilling Tools, Inc.247 The defendant distributor owed a substantial debt
to the plaintiff manufacturer, so the parties worked on an asset purchase
agreement to exchange the distributor’s assets for its debt.248 The parties
were unable to finalize the agreement, and after their relationship broke
down, the manufacturer sued the distributor and the distributor’s
owner.249 The jury found in the manufacturer’s favor, and the trial court
239. Id. at 392–93. In general, a “shut-in royalty clause” is a “substitute or contractual
method of production, which will maintain the lease in force . . . when a gas well is drilled”
and “no market exists” for the gas. Id. at 395 (citing Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker
Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ)). To “negate [this]
clause,” the “party seeking to terminate the lease” must show “that the well was . . . not
capable of producing in paying quantities,” which is a determination that “must be made
over a reasonable period of time.” Id.
240. Id. at 393.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 397.
243. Id. at 398.
244. Id. at 401.
245. Id. at 402.
246. Id.
247. 516 S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
248. Id. at 154.
249. Id.
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entered a judgment of just over $1 million against the defendants.250
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals rejected all of the defend-
ants’ complaints and affirmed. For example, the defendants asserted the
trial court erroneously found that an asset purchase agreement existed
where there was neither a written agreement nor “a finding of full per-
formance,” meaning that “enforcing the [agreement] would violate the
statute[ ] of frauds.”251 According to the defendants, the trial court erred
in failing to submit their proposed “instruction on ‘full’ performance,” as
counsel for the plaintiffs had “stipulated” they were arguing full perform-
ance, not partial performance, and Texas law required a showing of full
performance to escape the statute of frauds.252 The court of appeals re-
jected both of these grounds, finding that the plaintiffs’ counsel had not
made a binding stipulation and that Texas law recognizes a “partial-per-
formance exception to the statute of frauds.”253 Thus, the court upheld
the trial court’s instruction, which was consistent with both Texas law and
the Pattern Jury Charge.254 The court of appeals also rejected the defend-
ants’ challenge that the charge failed to state it was the plaintiff who
needed to partially perform, as they waived that complaint by failing to
raise it at trial.255
XI. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
The Texas Supreme Court again addressed the propriety of granting a
motion for new trial during this Survey period.256 The case involved a
dispute between attorneys and their client regarding a contingency fee.
After obtaining a significant verdict for the client, the client settled the
case, receiving money and a return of his interest in a business.257 The
client paid the attorneys their share of the monetary amount, but argued
that the fee agreement did not allow the attorneys to obtain an interest in
the business recovered.258 The trial court initially found the fee agree-
ment “ambiguous and submitted the issue to the jury,” which “found that
the attorneys were not entitled to an ownership interest in [the busi-
ness].”259 The trial court entered judgment based on the verdict, but then
granted a motion for new trial.260 In the second trial, the court found that
“the [a]greement ‘unambiguously’ provide[d]” that the attorneys could
250. Id. at 155.
251. Id. at 158.
252. Id. at 160.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 161.
255. Id. at 162. The court of appeals also held that the defendants, in failing to make
“timely, specific objection[s],” had waived any complaint that three broad-form jury ques-
tions “contained an invalid theory” and that the damages question failed to match the
damages awarded to a specific defendant and thus imposed joint and several liability for
contractual damages. Id. at 157–58, 165.
256. In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d 452, 454 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding).
257. Id. at 454–55.
258. Id. at 455.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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obtain an interest in the business.261 The client sought mandamus relief.
The supreme court began its analysis by summarizing its “evolving ju-
risprudence” regarding its review of orders granting new trial.262 The su-
preme court noted that an order granting a motion for new trial had to be
“specific,” “legally appropriate,” and “issued . . . for valid reasons.”263
The supreme court then analyzed the fee agreement and agreed with the
trial court that the fee agreement was unambiguous, but found it unam-
biguously provided that the attorneys were not entitled to an interest in
the business.264 Accordingly, the supreme court held the trial court
abused its discretion.265 Interestingly, two justices concurred in the result
but noted that the varying interpretations of the fee agreement made by
the trial court and the majority led them to believe that the fee agreement
was ambiguous.266 Therefore, the concurring justices held the trial court
improperly granted a motion for new trial because it was based on the
trial court’s erroneous ruling that the agreement was unambiguous.267
Two courts of appeals also addressed issues regarding motions for new
trial during the Survey period.268 Whether the granting of a motion for
new trial could be appealed after the case was retried was at issue in
Nelson.269 There, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals reaffirmed
that “an order granting a new trial . . . is generally not subject to review”
after entry of a subsequent judgment following “further proceedings in
the trial court.”270 The First Houston Court of Appeals addressed a situa-
tion relating to the interplay of negligent and intentional acts.271 This case
arose out of a fire set in a community living center by one of the patients.
The plaintiffs sued the patient and, despite the patient admitting that she
started the fire, the jury did not find the patient negligent.272 The trial
court granted a motion for new trial reasoning that “the jury’s failure to
find [the patient’s] negligence” was “so against the great weight of the
evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust” since it was undis-
puted that the patient started the fire.273 The court of appeals found the
granting of a new trial was an abuse of discretion for two reasons: (1) the
jury could have determined that lighting the fire was not the proximate
cause of injury because there was evidence in the record of numerous




265. Id. at 459.
266. Id. (Boyd, J., concurring).
267. Id. at 459–60.
268. See In re Wagner, No. 01-15-00774-CV, 2017 WL 6374549, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 14, 2017, no pet.) (orig. proceeding); Nelson v. Gulf Coast Cancer
& Diagnostic Ctr. at Se., Inc., 529 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,
no pet.).
269. Nelson, 529 S.W.3d at 549.
270. Id.
271. In re Wagner, 2017 WL 6374549, at *8.
272. Id. at *5.
273. Id.
98 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
other potential causes; and (2) an intentional act does not support a find-
ing of negligence.274 As noted in the concurring opinion, if the jury deter-
mined that the patient intentionally set the fire, it properly found that the
patient did not negligently start the fire since the two concepts are mutu-
ally exclusive.275
XII. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
The Texas Supreme Court applied the American Home Products276
presumptions regarding nonlawyer employee conduct to disqualify a firm
employing a paralegal in In re Turner.277 In this case, while employed
with the plaintiff’s firm, the paralegal worked on the Turner matter. Her
work included exchanging emails with opposing counsel, communicating
directly with Turner, reviewing Turner’s confidential client information,
and attending meetings in which counsel discussed case strategy.278 Eight
months later, the defense firm, without knowledge of her prior employ-
ment, hired the paralegal and failed to “instruct[ her] to refrain from
working on any matters on which she might have worked” for any prior
employers.279 For several months afterwards, the paralegal worked on the
Turner matter at the defense firm (“largely in a clerical capacity”) until
Turner’s counsel noticed her participation and demanded that the defense
firm immediately withdraw because of the conflict.280 The defense firm
“refused to withdraw” without “‘proof’ that [the paralegal] actually
worked on the Turner matter” (which the paralegal denied) and took va-
rious remedial actions, including screening the paralegal from the case.281
The supreme court began its analysis by setting out the “two-step pro-
cess” and applicable presumptions to determine whether “a nonlawyer
employee’s conduct” requires disqualification282 and concluded its analy-
sis by holding, under these facts, that disqualification was required.283
The supreme court focused on the rebuttable shared-confidences pre-
274. Id. at *9–11.
275. Id. at *13–15 (Jennings, J., concurring).
276. In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 985 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
277. 542 S.W.3d 553, 555–56 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam).
278. Id. at 554.
279. Id. at 554–55. Apparently, the paralegal “did not disclose her prior employment at
[the plaintiff’s firm] on her resume” and did not “volunteer any information” about that
prior employment during the interview with the defense firm. Id.
280. Id. at 555.
281. Id.
282. Id. Specifically, the supreme court explained that a firm must be disqualified if the
nonlawyer employee “(1) obtained confidential information about the matter while work-
ing at the opposing firm and (2) then shared that information with her current firm.” Id. at
555–56 (citing In re Guar. Ins. Serv., 343 S.W.3d 130, 134 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam)). Since it was undisputed that the paralegal had “‘actually worked’ on the
Turner matter while employed” by the plaintiff’s firm, the supreme court held that she was
“presumed to have obtained confidential information.” Id. at 556 (citing In re Columbia
Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819, 824 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding)) (explain-
ing that the presumption is irrebuttable to “prevent the moving party from being forced to
reveal the very confidences sought to be protected”).
283. Id. at 558.
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sumption, explaining it could only be rebutted by showing that: (1) the
employee had been directed not to “work on any matter[s] on which she
worked during her prior employment” or matters of which she had infor-
mation because of prior employment; and (2) “the firm took ‘other rea-
sonable steps to ensure’” the paralegal did not work on any of these
matters “absent client consent.”284 The supreme court held that the de-
fense firm did not “rebut the . . . shared-confidences presumption” be-
cause it had not properly “instruct[ed the paralegal] to refrain from
working on the Turner matter until after learning of her conflict.”285 The
supreme court emphasized there was no evidence that the defense firm
provided any such instruction to the paralegal initially, warning that
“[c]asual admonitions to refrain from working on conflicted matters are
insufficient to meet the first prong” and the firm’s “later-enacted” reme-
dial measures under the second prong, even if effective, “were simply too
late.”286 The supreme court reasoned that disqualification protects
against the “threat of disclosure” rather than actual disclosure, and firms
therefore “must instruct a nonlawyer to refrain from working on con-
flicted matters before she commences work on a particular matter” re-
gardless of a firm’s knowledge of the “precise conflict.”287 The supreme
court therefore “conditionally grant[ed] mandamus relief and direct[ed]
the trial court to grant [the] motion to disqualify” the defense firm.288
Two cases in the courts of appeals addressed whether alleged attorney
conflicts required disqualification. In Hendricks v. Barker,289 the Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals held that “the trial court did not abuse
its discretion [in] disqualifying” an attorney who had represented both
the buyer and seller of real estate in a dispute over their contract for
deed.290 After executing the contract for deed, the buyer and seller dis-
puted the amount owed under the contract, and the buyer filed suit
against the seller seeking, among other things, possession of the prop-
erty.291 Nine days after answering the suit, the seller moved to disqualify
the buyer’s attorney, asserting that she had consulted the attorney three
years before for assistance in preparing the deed for the same prop-
erty.292 The “trial court granted [the buyer’s] motion to disqualify” and
“dismissed the case for want of prosecution” ten months later when the
284. Id. at 556 (quoting In re Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d at 824).
285. Id. at 557. The supreme court declined to address the “effectiveness” of the de-
fense firm’s after-the-fact screening measures because the firm failed to meet the “first
prong by instructing the nonlawyer employee to refrain from working on any conflicted
matters.” Id. at 556.
286. Id. at 556–57.
287. Id. at 557 (citing cases finding that second firm’s initial instruction “not to perform
work on any matter on which she worked during her former employment, including the
conflicted matter” or “not to engage with matters on which [she] had worked previously”
had “satisfied the first prong of the shared-confidences presumption”).
288. Id. at 558.
289. 523 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
290. Id. at 160.
291. Id. at 155.
292. Id. at 155, 160.
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buyer did not appear for trial.293 On appeal, the court of appeals held
that the seller’s four-page letter from the attorney focusing on prepara-
tion of the buyer’s deed, requesting information to prepare that deed, and
advising the seller about accounting issues with the buyer-seller contract
for deed, along with the record of the hearing on the disqualification mo-
tion, was sufficient to support “an implied finding that an attorney-client
relationship” between the attorney and seller “was created by the parties’
conduct.”294 The court of appeals held that the finding was supported by
the evidence of five facts,295 which taken together “permit[ted] an infer-
ence that [the seller] intended for [the attorney] to provide legal services
for her, and that [the attorney] agreed” to do so.296 Having found the
existence of an attorney-client relationship, the court of appeals had little
trouble concluding that the attorney violated Rule 1.09 of the Texas Dis-
ciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct297 and affirming the attorney’s
disqualification.298
On the opposite side of the spectrum, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
in Busby v. Harvey affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dis-
qualify based on an attorney’s alleged conflict of interest.299 In this veteri-
nary malpractice case, horse owners asserted malpractice claims against a
veterinarian for treatment that allegedly resulted in severe injuries to one
293. Id. at 155–56. Despite the prior disqualification order, the attorney filed the
buyer’s notice of appeal two days before the trial setting, claiming the buyer did not re-
ceive adequate notice of the setting. Id.
294. Id. at 158–59. The trial court did not explicitly make that finding in the record, but
“articulated three concerns: first, that [the attorney] may have engaged [the seller] as a
client; second, that [the attorney] may have been acting as a ‘broker’ between [the buyer
and seller]; and third, that [the attorney] may have to be called as a fact witness against [the
seller].” Id. at 159.
295. Id. at 159. The court of appeals relied on the following evidence:
(1) [The attorney] had discussions with [the seller] concerning the contro-
versy with [the buyer], which [the attorney] described as “a legal matter” in
his letter; (2) [the attorney] requested documentation from [the seller] in or-
der to resolve this controversy; (3) [the attorney] rendered legal advice to
[the seller] regarding the use of contracts for deed; (4) [the attorney] advised
[the seller] of his hourly rate, the amount of time he had already spent on
services for her, and the total amount of time he expected to spend for reso-
lution of her issues; and (5) [the seller] told [the attorney] that she believed
he was her attorney.
Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. Rule 1.09 prohibits “a lawyer who personally has formerly represented a client”
from later representing “another person in a matter adverse to the former client if it is the
same or a substantially related matter.” Id. at 158. Since the attorney’s representation of
the buyer and later the seller both involved the contract for deed between them, the court
of appeals held that the seller] established as a matter of law that an appearance of impro-
priety exists and that she is entitled to a conclusive presumption that confidences and
secrets were imparted to her former attorney.” Id. at 159 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Further, the court of appeals held “[the seller] was not required to prove
that she was actually prejudiced” by the conflict because it was presumed given the sub-
stantial relationship of the attorney’s representation of the parties. Id. at 160.
298. Id. at 159–60.
299. Busby v. Harvey, No. 02-16-00311-CV, 2017 WL 3184732, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth July 27, 2017, no pet.).
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of their horse’s legs.300 The owners moved to disqualify the veterinarian’s
attorney, claiming that they had contacted the attorney, the attorney had
recommended a specific expert to them based on “sensitive” facts they
disclosed, and the attorney, weeks later, appeared as counsel for the vet-
erinarian.301 The trial court denied the motion, the parties tried the case
to a jury, and “[t]he jury found that no negligence of [the veterinarian]
proximately caused” the horse’s injury.302 The owners appealed, challeng-
ing only the trial court’s denial of the disqualification motion.303
The court of appeals detailed the conflicting evidence in the record
from the owners and attorney regarding the communications between
them,304 but held that it need not decide under the circumstances whether
the attorney’s representation violated the disciplinary rules.305 Instead,
the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s denial of the disqualification
motion based on the owners’ failure to show actual prejudice from the
attorney’s representation of the veterinarian.306 In particular, the court of
appeals rejected the owners’ complaint that the attorney used “insider
knowledge” gained from the owners for strategic advantage, noting as an
example that the record reflected that the attorney never “referred to or
. . . used the” owners’ “difficulty in finding a local expert” at trial.307 The
court further reasoned that the owners had not shown that any of the
attorney’s criticisms of the owners’ expert at trial “had anything to do
with the contents of [the attorney’s] pretrial conversation with [the
owner] or that he would not have made those criticisms without speaking
to [the owner].”308 Finally, the court of appeals rejected the owners’ argu-
ment that the attorney “unfairly” was able to choose both sides’ experts,
reasoning that after the mere referral, the attorney had nothing further to
do with the owners’ investigation, retention, designation, or presentation
of the expert at trial.309 The court of appeals therefore affirmed the trial
court’s refusal to disqualify the attorney.310
XIII. MISCELLANEOUS
For the first time, the Texas Supreme Court addressed in this Survey
period responsible third-party practice under Chapter 33 of the Texas
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at *2.
303. Id.
304. Id. at *3–6. The owners’ counsel testified that he contacted the attorney seeking
legal advice not only about an expert but also about potentially adding him to the legal
team and disclosed facts about the case. In contrast, the attorney testified the owner made
it clear that he was not retaining him as an attorney, but wanted a referral for an expert
because his retained attorney was having a difficult time locating anyone local, and did not
disclose any facts about the case. Id. at *3–4.
305. Id. at *5.
306. Id. at *8.
307. Id. at *6–7.
308. Id. at *7.
309. Id. at *8.
310. Id.
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Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In In re Coppola, the supreme court
held that a defendant could designate an opposing party’s transactional
counsel as a responsible third party in a real estate dispute.311 In this case,
the buyers purchased unimproved land with the intention of building a
veterinary clinic on the site, consulting two attorneys in connection with
the transaction regarding various legal matters. When the buyers discov-
ered after the closing that local ordinances required a twenty-five foot
right-of-way for commercial improvements, thereby preventing their in-
tended use of the property, they sued the sellers, who had provided a
survey reflecting a fifteen foot right-of-way, for fraud and deceptive trade
practices. Before trial, the sellers requested to designate the two attor-
neys the buyers had consulted pre-closing as responsible third parties. In
their request, they alleged that the attorneys breached their duty of care
by failing to advise the buyers of the right-of-way affecting their intended
use of the site.312 The buyers objected to the designation, asserting that
the sellers “improperly sought to designate attorneys as responsible third
parties”; the “trial court summarily denied the motion . . . without grant-
ing leave to replead.”313 The court of appeals denied the sellers manda-
mus relief.314
On mandamus, the Texas Supreme Court quoted Section 33.004’s
mandatory “shall grant” language,315 emphasizing that despite timely ob-
jection: “[T]he court must allow the designation unless the objecting
party establishes (1) the defendant did not plead sufficient facts concern-
ing the person’s alleged responsibility and (2) the pleading defect persists
after an opportunity to replead.”316 The supreme court held that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying the motion to designate for two
reasons.317 First, the supreme court determined that the motion, filed
sixty-six days before the third trial setting, was timely because it “[found]
nothing in the proportionate-responsibility statute supporting a construc-
tion of section 33.004(a) as limiting the phrase ‘the trial date’ to an initial
trial setting rather than the trial date at the time a motion to designate is
filed.”318 Second, the supreme court found that the trial court erred by
denying the motion without granting the sellers leave to replead, rejected
the buyers’ policy arguments regarding designating attorneys, and ex-
plained that “nothing in the proportionate-responsibility statute pre-
cludes a party from designating an attorney as a responsible third
party.”319 The supreme court declined to address whether the sellers’
pleading of the attorneys’ responsibility was sufficient because, regardless
of any deficiency, “the trial court lacked discretion to deny the motion to
311. In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 507 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
312. Id. at 507.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(f) (West 2015)).
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designate without affording [the sellers] an opportunity to replead.”320
Finally, the supreme court agreed with the majority of lower courts of
appeals’ determination that mandamus relief was appropriate for errone-
ous denial of responsible third party designations,321 granted the sellers
mandamus relief, and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying
the third party designation motion.322
In Chavez v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., the Texas Supreme
Court addressed the operative effect of evidentiary presumptions at trial
and in summary judgment proceedings.323 In this case, the parties’ coun-
sel signed a letter agreement of settlement after “the trial court granted
[the plaintiff’s] motion for new trial” following a defense jury verdict.324
“[A]t a hearing to approve the” settlement, the plaintiff “appeared and
stated that she ‘wished not to go forward’ and requested ‘at least three
months to find . . . another law firm’ because she ‘[did] not feel comforta-
ble with’ the firm that had been representing her.”325 “The trial court
reset the hearing, and the [defendant] moved to enforce the settle-
ment.”326 While the plaintiff did not appear at the reset hearing, her for-
mer counsel advised the trial court that even though “she no longer
represented” the plaintiff, the plaintiff “had consented to the settle-
ment.”327 “The trial court granted the [defendant’s] motion” to enforce
the settlement and entered judgment accordingly, “awarding [the plain-
tiff] $531,000.00, of which $325,000.00 went” towards her former law
firm’s expenses.328
After the plaintiff’s first appeal and remand of the case for defendant’s
failure to file the settlement agreement of record, the defendant filed the
settlement agreement and moved for summary judgment on its newly ad-
ded breach of contract claim. To show plaintiff’s consent to the settle-
ment, the defendant relied solely on evidence “that [the plaintiff] was
represented during settlement negotiations by the same law firm that had
represented her at trial, including the attorney who executed the settle-
ment agreement.”329 The plaintiff responded to the motion, denying “by
affidavit, that she . . . consented to the settlement.”330 The trial court
granted the motion, and the plaintiff “appealed, arguing that her counsel
320. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(g); In re Smith, 366
S.W.3d 282, 288 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, orig. proceeding) (“[T]he trial judge was statuto-
rily required to give relators an opportunity to replead before denying their motion, re-
gardless of whether they made a specific request for time to replead.”)).
321. Id. at 509 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding)).
322. Id. at 510.






329. Id. at 900.
330. Id.
104 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
[lacked] authority to bind her to the settlement agreement.”331 The court
of appeals affirmed, reasoning that “it would indulge every reasonable
presumption to support a settlement agreement made by an attorney
hired by a client.”332 The Texas Supreme Court granted review, reversed
the grant of summary judgment, and remanded the case.333
The supreme court explained that even assuming that an attorney hired
by a client is presumed to have authority to agree to a settlement on the
client’s behalf, that presumption is rebuttable, and the defendant could
not rely on a presumption on summary judgment “to shift to the [plain-
tiff] the burden of raising a fact issue of rebuttal.”334 In other words, the
supreme court held that the defendant had the summary judgment bur-
den “to establish affirmatively that there was no genuine issue” that the
plaintiff “actually authorized” the law firm to execute the “settlement
agreement on her behalf.”335 Because the supreme court found the de-
fendant’s evidence that the plaintiff hired counsel and counsel agreed to
the settlement failed to satisfy this burden, it held that the trial court
erred in granting the summary judgment motion.336
XIV. CONCLUSION
The Texas Supreme Court and intermediate courts of appeals have
continued during this Survey period to expand precedent on existing pro-
cedural rules to guide the trial courts in properly managing their dockets.
331. Id.
332. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
333. Id. at 901.
334. Id. at 900. “The presumptions and burden of proof for an ordinary or conventional
trial . . . are immaterial to the burden that a movant for summary judgment must bear.”
Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co. v. City of Dallas, 623 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. 1981) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
335. Id. at 900–01.
336. Id. at 901.
